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WAITING TO BE AN AMERICAN: THE COURTS’ PROPER ROLE 
AND FUNCTION IN ALLEVIATING NATURALIZATION 
APPLICANTS’ WOES IN 8 U.S.C. § 1447(B) ACTIONS 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
At the age of 17, Zuhair Mah’d, a Jordanian national, came to the United 
States to attend college.1  After finishing college, Mah’d remained in the U.S., 
putting his knowledge to work by making computers for the blind.2  In 2004, in 
his 30s, Mah’d applied to become a U.S. citizen.3  However, approximately 
two years later, Mah’d’s naturalization application had neither been granted 
nor denied by the U.S. government, presumably due to the FBI’s backlog in 
conducting name checks.4  Thus, after waiting for more than two years for a 
determination on his naturalization application, Mah’d took the FBI and the 
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) to court to receive a 
determination on his application.5  Due to the delay, the court ordered USCIS 
to issue a decision on Mah’d’s application after the completion of the FBI 
background checks, and Mah’d hoped to pick up his citizenship papers shortly 
after the decision.6 
However, Mah’d is not the only individual who has waited years for a 
determination on his naturalization application.  Thousands of individuals have 
waited for years to receive decisions on both naturalization applications and 
permanent-resident applications due to a backlog in the FBI name-check 
process.7  As of May 6, 2008, there were 269,943 FBI name checks pending.8  
Over 17,000 name checks had been pending for over a year, while close to 
5,000 name checks had been pending for nearly three years.9  Since the horrific 
 
 1. Day to Day: Background-Check Backlogs Delay Citizenship Bid (NPR radio broadcast 
May 2, 2007), available at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=9958267 
[hereinafter NPR]. 
 2. Id. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. 
 5. See id. See also Mahd v. Chertoff, No. 06-CV-01023-WDM-PAC, 2007 WL 891867, at 
*3 (D. Colo. Mar. 22, 2007). 
 6. NPR, supra note 1. See also Mahd, 2007 WL 891867, at *3. 
 7. U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERV., OMBUDSMAN ANN. REP. 2008, at 6, 
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/CISOMB_Annual_Report_2008.pdf [hereinafter 2008 
OMBUDSMAN REPORT]. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. 
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events of September 11, 2001, name checks have slowed down the clearance 
process on naturalization applications.10  As a result of long delays, individuals 
waiting for determinations on their naturalization applications are in limbo: 
they are barred from voting, cannot get certain jobs, have difficulties adopting 
children, and can be separated from their families.11  Thus now many 
individuals, like Mah’d, are going to court to compel a determination on their 
naturalization applications by using 8 U.S.C. § 1447(b) to their advantage, 
which states: 
If there is a failure to make a determination [on the naturalization application 
by USCIS] . . . before the end of the 120-day period after the date on which the 
examination is conducted . . . the applicant may apply to the United States 
district court for the district in which the applicant resides for a hearing on the 
matter. Such court has jurisdiction over the matter and may either determine 
the matter or remand the matter, with appropriate instructions, to [USCIS] to 
determine the matter.12 
However, courts have conflicted over the meaning of this statute.  Many 
times, once an applicant files an action in a district court pursuant to § 1447(b), 
USCIS will deny the application while the action is pending in court.  In 
situations such as these, some courts have held that the district courts have 
exclusive jurisdiction over the matter,13 while other courts have held that the 
district courts and USCIS have concurrent jurisdiction over the matter and 
consider the matter moot.14  If in fact the court retains jurisdiction over a § 
1447(b) action, the court must decide to either remand the case to USCIS with 
appropriate instructions or determine whether the naturalization application 
should be granted.15  For different reasons, courts have split on this issue as 
well.16 
This comment will first examine the history behind naturalization 
procedures in the U.S. Second, this comment will analyze the conflicting 
 
 10. NPR, supra note 1. 
 11. After Years of Delay, Lawsuits Jumpstart Path to US Citizenship, INT’L HERALD TRIB., 
Dec. 25, 2007, at 1. 
 12. 8 U.S.C. § 1447(b) (2006). 
 13. See, e.g., Etape v. Chertoff, 497 F.3d 379, 381 (4th Cir. 2007) (holding that the district 
courts have exclusive jurisdiction over 8 U.S.C. § 1447(b) petitions); U.S. v. Hovsepian, 359 F.3d 
1144, 1159 (9th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (finding that the district courts have exclusive jurisdiction 
over pending naturalization applications after 120 days of the applicant’s examination). 
 14. See, e.g., Bustamante v. Chertoff, 533 F. Supp. 2d 373, 376 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (concluding 
that the district courts and immigration agencies have concurrent jurisdiction over 8 U.S.C. § 
1447(b) petitions). 
 15. 8 U.S.C. § 1447(b). 
 16. See, e.g., Taalebinezhaad v. Chertoff, 581 F. Supp. 2d 243, 246 (D. Mass. 2008) 
(denying USCIS’s motion for remand); Manzoor v. Chertoff, 472 F. Supp. 2d 801, 810 (E.D. Va. 
2007) (remanding the naturalization application to USCIS with instructions on how to proceed on 
the application). 
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opinions among the courts as to whether 8 U.S.C. § 1447(b) provides the 
district courts with exclusive jurisdiction over pending naturalization 
applications or whether the district courts and USCIS share jurisdiction over 
§ 1447(b) actions.  Additionally, where courts have retained jurisdiction, this 
comment will address different court decisions to either remand the matter 
back to USCIS or adjudicate the application.  Finally, this comment will 
conclude with the author’s analysis that courts should retain exclusive 
jurisdiction and determine the applications on their merits. 
II.  THE NATURALIZATION PROCESS 
A. The Naturalization Process Prior to the Homeland Security Act 
The U.S. federal government has not always controlled naturalization 
proceedings and immigration regulations.17  When the American Revolution 
ended in 1783, just years after the colonies declared their independence, the 
federal government left naturalization matters to the states.18  It was not until 
1790 when Congress took naturalization matters into its own hands.19 Under 
the 1790 Act, free, adult, white individuals who had resided in the U.S. for at 
least two years were eligible for U.S. citizenship.20  In order to obtain 
citizenship, a petitioner had to file a naturalization application with a state or 
federal court in the state where the petitioner resided.21  Despite small 
legislative alterations to naturalization requirements throughout the following 
century, the basic framework under the 1790 Act applied: petitioners were to 
bring their naturalization applications to a court in their state of residence.22 
Agencies first made their mark on immigration matters in the Immigration 
Act of 1891.23  Under the supervision of the Treasury Department, the Bureau 
of Immigration was established to regulate immigration laws.24  However, the 
 
 17. WALTER A. EWING, IMMIGRATION POLICY CTR., OPPORTUNITY AND EXCLUSION: A 
BRIEF HISTORY OF U.S. IMMIGRATION POLICY 2 (2008), http://www.immigrationpolicy.org/sites/ 
default/files/docs/OpportunityExclusion11-25-08.pdf. 
 18. Id. See also U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERV., IMMIGRATION LEGAL HISTORY: 
LEGISLATION FROM 1790–1900, at 1, available at http://www.uscis.gov/files/nativedocuments/ 
Legislation%20from%201790%20-%201900.pdf [hereinafter LEGISLATION FROM 1790–1900]. 
 19. Act of Mar. 26, 1790, ch. 3, § 1, 1 Stat. 103, 104, repealed by Act of Jan. 29, 1795, ch. 
20, § 4, 1 Stat. 414, 415. 
 20. § 1, 1 Stat. at 103. See also EWING, supra note 17, at 2; EILLEEN BOLGER, ROCKY 
MOUNTAIN REG’L NAT’L ARCHIVES & REC. ADMIN., BACKGROUND HISTORY OF THE UNITED 
STATES NATURALIZATION PROCESS (2003), http://www.colorado.gov/dpa/doit/archives/nat 
info.htm. 
 21. § 1, 1 Stat. at 103. See also BOLGER, supra note 20. 
 22. Nancy Morawetz, Citizenship and the Courts, 2007 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 447, 451 (2007). 
 23. LEGISLATION FROM 1790–1900, supra note 18, at 4. See also Immigration Act of Mar. 3, 
1891, ch. 551, § 7, 26 Stat. 1084, 1085. 
 24. LEGISLATION FROM 1790–1900, supra note 18, at 4. See also § 7, 26 Stat. at 1085. 
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Bureau did not stay in the Treasury Department’s hands for long.  In 1903, the 
Bureau was transferred to the Department of Commerce and Labor, where a 
commissioner was granted control over enforcing immigration laws.25  
Naturalization matters were later transferred to the Department of Commerce 
and Labor in the Naturalization Act of 1906, and the Bureau of Immigration 
became the Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization.26  Not only did the 
1906 Naturalization Act combine both immigration and naturalization matters 
into one agency, but the Act also added more requirements to become a 
naturalized citizen, such as the ability to understand English.27 
In 1933, the Bureau’s name was changed to the Immigration and 
Naturalization Services (INS) by executive order.28  Although the INS was an 
agency under the Department of Labor and Commerce, 29 the Department of 
Justice played a predominant role in enforcing immigration laws.30  Thus, in 
1940, for security purposes, the Department of Justice took over the INS.31  
However, despite the INS taking over immigration and naturalization matters, 
the INS was not equipped to award citizenship.32  This power was still left to 
the courts.33 
An important advancement in U.S. immigration and naturalization policy 
occurred in the 20th century.  Prior to 1952, not all races were entitled to 
become U.S. citizens.34  However, in 1952, Congress took a big leap in 
reforming its naturalization laws by allowing all races to apply for 
 
 25. U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERV., IMMIGRATION LEGAL HISTORY: 
LEGISLATION FROM 1901–1940, at 1, http://www.uscis.gov/files/nativedocuments/Legislation% 
20from%201901-1940.pdf [hereinafter LEGISLATION FROM 1901–1940].  See also Act of Feb. 14, 
1903, ch. 552, § 4, 32 Stat. 825, 826–27. 
 26. LEGISLATION FROM 1901–1940, supra note 25, at 1. See also Naturalization Act of June 
29, 1906, ch. 3592, § 1, 34 Stat. 596. 
 27. LEGISLATION FROM 1901–1940, supra note 25, at 1. See also § 8, 34 Stat. at 599. 
 28. U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PROT., U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service–
Populating a Nation: A History of Immigration and Naturalization, Sept. 10, 2008, 
http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/about/history/legacy/ins_history.xml [hereinafter CBP]. 
 29. § 4, 32 Stat. at 826. 
 30. BOLGER, supra note 20. 
 31. LEGISLATION FROM 1901–1940, supra note 25, at 6. See also Act of June 4, 1940, ch. 
231, § 3, 54 Stat. 230, 231; BOLGER, supra note 20; CBP, supra note 28 (noting that the 
Immigration and Naturalization Bureau become the Immigration and Naturalization Service in 
1933). 
 32. See Morawetz, supra note 22, at 452. 
 33. Id. 
 34. See, e.g., Act of Mar. 26, 1790, ch. 3, § 1, 1 Stat. 103, repealed by Act of Jan. 29, 1795, 
ch. 20, § 4, 1 Stat. 414, 415 (Act only allowing white adults to become citizens); Act of July 14, 
1870, ch. 254, § 7, 16 Stat. 254, 256 (Act allowing immigrants of African descent to naturalize); 
Act of July 2, 1946, ch. 534, § 1, 60 Stat. 416 (Act authorizing naturalization of individuals from 
India and the Philippine Islands). 
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naturalization in the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (INA).35  Not 
only did the INA make major changes to U.S. naturalization policy, but it also 
integrated all other immigration statutes into the INA and codified existing 
immigration and naturalization provisions.36  Today the INA is still the 
primary source of immigration law.37 
Although the courts retained exclusive jurisdiction over naturalization 
adjudications, federal agencies continued to play a key function in the 
naturalization process.  In the 1980s, naturalization applicants were required to 
submit an application to a naturalization court.38  After submitting the 
application, an INS employee administered an examination,39 and would 
submit a recommendation to the court to grant or deny citizenship to the 
applicant.40  Generally, courts would follow the recommendations of the INS 
employee in either granting or denying citizenship.41 
In the 1980s, there were a number of concerns regarding naturalization 
delays caused by backlogs in the courts’ dockets.42  Prior to the enactment of 
the Immigration Act of 1990, this concern was reflected in a House Report, 
which stated, “Fully qualified applicants must wait two years in some places to 
be sworn in as a U.S. citizen.  This, of course, affects employment 
opportunities, travel plans, and . . . most importantly, deprives these 
individuals of their right to vote.”43  Another concern in the House Report 
included indetermination on the part of naturalization examiners, which helped 
support the fact that applicants should still be able to utilize the court system.44  
As seen in the House Report, “Congress sought to achieve two major goals: to 
‘streamline’ the process of acquiring citizenship so as to solve the problem of 
unnecessary delays, and to preserve full recourse to the courts.”45 
The courts’ basic power to grant naturalization applications, for the most 
part, ended with an amendment to the INA in 1990, known as the Immigration 
 
 35. Immigration and Nationality Act of June 27, 1952 (INA), Pub. L. No. 82-414, ch. 2, § 
311, 66 Stat. 239 (1952) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1422 (2006)). 
 36. U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERV., IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY ACT, 
http://www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis/menuitem.eb1d4c2a3e5b9ac89243c6a7543f6d1a/?vgnextoi
d=f3829c7755cb9010VgnVCM10000045f3d6a1RCRD&vgnextchannel=f3829c7755cb9010Vgn
VCM10000045f3d6a1RCRD. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Morawetz, supra note 22, at 452. See also 8 U.S.C. § 1445(a) (1988). 
 39. Morawetz, supra note 22, at 452. See also 8 U.S.C. § 1446(b) (1988). 
 40. Morawetz, supra note 22, at 452–53. See also 8 U.S.C. § 1446(c). 
 41. Morawetz, supra note 22, at 453. See also H.R. REP. NO. 101-187, at 10 (1989). 
 42. Morawetz, supra note 22, at 453–54. 
 43. Id. See also H.R. REP. NO. 101-187, at 8 (1989). 
 44. Morawetz, supra note 22, at 454. See also H.R. REP. NO. 101-187, at 12, 14. 
 45. Morawetz, supra note 22, at 454. See also H.R. REP. NO. 101-187, at 8, 14. 
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Act of 1990.46  The Immigration Act of 1990 gave the Attorney General 
exclusive jurisdiction over naturalization adjudications,47 which, for the first 
time, granted an agency the power to grant or deny naturalization 
applications.48  Instead of the courts giving their final stamp of approval on 
naturalization applications, the INS was given the authority to grant citizenship 
through the Attorney General.49  Thus, the Immigration Act of 1990 ended the 
courts’ 200-year reign over adjudicating naturalization applications. 
B. Current Naturalization Procedures 
After the deadly attacks of 9/11, the U.S. once again saw a change in 
immigration and naturalization policies.  The Homeland Security Act 
abolished the INS in 2002,50 and the newly created Department of Homeland 
Security took over the INS tasks.51  INS’s former functions were separated into 
three branches: United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), 
Information and Customs Enforcement (ICE), and Customs and Border 
Protection (CBP).52  Among other functions, USCIS took charge of 
naturalization applications and adjudications.53 
Now, an individual wishing to obtain U.S. citizenship must file a 
naturalization application with USCIS.54  Generally, in order to become a 
naturalized citizen, the applicant must know the English language, be familiar 
with U.S. history and government,55 and be at least 18 years of age.56  
Furthermore, an applicant must have resided in the U.S. for at least 5 years as a 
permanent resident before he or she may become a naturalized citizen.57 
After a naturalization application has been submitted, USCIS conducts an 
investigation to determine if the applicant is fit for U.S. citizenship.58  At a 
 
 46. Morawetz, supra note 22, at 454; U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERV., 
IMMIGRATION LEGAL HISTORY: LEGISLATION FROM 1981–1996, at 3–4, http://www.uscis.gov/ 
files/nativedocuments/Legislation%20from%201981-1996.pdf [hereinafter LEGISLATION FROM 
1981–1996]. 
 47. LEGISLATION FROM 1981–1996, supra note 46, at 3–4. See also 8 U.S.C. § 1446(d). 
 48. Morawetz, supra note 22, at 454. 
 49. Id. See also 8 U.S.C. § 1421(a) (2006); 8 U.S.C. § 1446(a). 
 50. 6 U.S.C. § 291(a) (Supp. 2002). 
 51. See Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135 (2002) 
(codified as amended at 6 U.S.C. § 101). See also Lauren E. Sasser, Waiting in Immigration 
Limbo: The Federal Court Split Over Suits to Compel Action on Stalled Adjustment of Status 
Applications, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 2511, 2514 (2008). 
 52. Sasser, supra note 51, at 2514. 
 53. Id. 
 54. See 8 U.S.C. § 1445(a) (2006). 
 55. 8 U.S.C. § 1423(a) (2006). 
 56. 8 U.S.C. § 1445(b). 
 57. 8 U.S.C. § 1427(a) (2006). 
 58. 8 C.F.R. § 335.1 (2009). See also 8 U.S.C. § 1446(a) (2006). 
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minimum, the investigation must include “a review of all pertinent records, 
police department checks, and a neighborhood investigation . . . .”59  
Additionally, a criminal background check must be performed under the 
supervision of the FBI, and only after there has been a definitive response from 
the FBI on the criminal background check will an applicant be able to appear 
before USCIS for his or her initial examination.60  The initial examination 
consists of a question-and-answer series administered under oath by a USCIS 
officer.61  So long as the applicant meets all statutory requirements, USCIS 
must grant the applicant’s naturalization application.62 
Although from the outset USCIS has the power to determine who may 
become a naturalized citizen, the court system still has some power in 
naturalization proceedings.  Congress has given courts the power to review 
USCIS’s denial of a naturalization application.63  If USCIS denies an 
application for naturalization, the applicant has the option to request a hearing 
before an immigration officer to appeal USCIS’s decision.64  It is only after the 
applicant has received a decision on his or her appeal that the applicant may go 
to court to request a review on his or her citizenship denial.65 
Furthermore, the courts have the power to determine naturalization 
applications when there is a delay at the agency level.66  Under 8 U.S.C. § 
1447(b), a naturalization applicant may petition a district court for a hearing on 
his or her naturalization application if USCIS delays on making a decision on 
the application.67  The applicant may only bring a § 1447(b) action after 120 
days of his or her naturalization examination.68  The “examination” has 
generally been held to mean the applicant’s initial interview with USCIS.69  
Thus, once the applicant’s initial interview with USCIS takes place, the “120-
day clock” begins to tick for the applicant to bring a § 1447(b) suit.70 
According to USCIS’s own regulation, a full criminal background check 
must be completed before the initial examination.71  The full criminal 
background check includes investigative results of criminal and administrative 
 
 59. 8 C.F.R. § 335.1. 
 60. 8 C.F.R. § 335.2(b) (2009). In the past, USCIS conducted initial interviews before 
proceeding with the FBI background checks; now, USCIS completes the FBI background checks 
before administering initial interviews. See 2008 OMBUDSMAN REPORT, supra note 7 at 5–7. 
 61. 8 C.F.R. § 335.2(c). 
 62. 8 C.F.R. § 335.3(a) (2009). 
 63. See 8 U.S.C. § 1421(c) (2006). 
 64. 8 U.S.C. § 1447(a) (2006). 
 65. 8 U.S.C. § 1421(c). 
 66. See 8 U.S.C. § 1447(b). 
 67. See id. 
 68. See id. 
 69. Manzoor v. Chertoff, 472 F. Supp. 2d 801, 806 (E.D. Va. 2007). 
 70. See id. 
 71. 8 C.F.R. § 335.2(b) (2006). 
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records, as well as fingerprint checks.72  In the past, name checks were not 
included in the criminal background check.73  Therefore, an individual’s initial 
examination could take place before the completion of the name check but 
only after the criminal background check.  However, in 2006, USCIS changed 
its policy and now requires that the name check be complete before the initial 
examination.74  Thus, now, the 120-day clock does not start ticking until both 
the name check and the initial interview are complete. Despite this change in 
policy, there are still individuals who have completed their initial interviews 
but are still waiting for clearance on their name checks, for these individuals 
applied for naturalization prior to the policy change.75  Furthermore, the new 
policy is relevant because it can deter § 1447(b) suits, and the applicants will 
more than likely have long wait times before hearing a response from USCIS.76  
By allowing the courts to maintain some power in the naturalization process, 
and at the same time, giving an agency the power to adjudicate naturalization 
petitions, there has been “considerable confusion in sorting through the proper 
role for the courts in naturalization cases.”77 
III.  DETERMINING WHETHER 8 U.S.C. § 1447(B) VESTS THE COURTS WITH 
EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION OR CONCURRENT JURISDICTION WITH USCIS 
After an applicant has waited more than 120 days from his or her 
naturalization examination and has heard no response from USCIS, many 
applicants bring suit against the government in a U.S. district court by utilizing 
§ 1447(b).78  However, the courts have conflicted in determining what 
authority they actually have under this statute.79  Some courts have held that 
the district courts have exclusive jurisdiction over the pending application.80  
Under this interpretation, regardless whether USCIS makes a determination on 
an application during a pending § 1447(b) action, the courts will reject 
 
 72. Id. 
 73. See Memorandum from Michael Aytes, Acting Assoc. Dir. of Domestic Operations, 
USCIS, Background Checks and Naturalization Interview Scheduling (Apr. 25, 2006), 
http://www.ailf.org/lac/uscismemo060425.pdf [hereinafter Memo on Background Checks]. 
 74. Id. 
 75. See, e.g., Janko v. Chertoff, No. 3:08-CV-145, 2009 WL 102961, at *1 (N.D. Ind. Jan. 
15, 2009) (naturalization applicant brought § 1447(b) action after the name-check policy change, 
but at the time he applied for naturalization, his initial interview was completed before the results 
of the name check); Semreen v. USCIS, No. 8:07-cv-1941-T-33TGW, 2008 WL 5381908, at *1 
(M.D. Fla. Dec. 23, 2008) (same). 
 76. NPR, supra note 1. 
 77. Morawetz, supra note 22, at 456. 
 78. See 8 U.S.C. § 1447(b) (2006). 
 79. See, e.g., Etape v. Chertoff, 497 F.3d 379, 381 (4th Cir. 2007); U.S. v. Hovsepian, 359 
F.3d 1144, 1164 (9th Cir. 2004) (en banc); Bustamante v. Chertoff, 533 F. Supp. 2d 373, 381 
(S.D.N.Y. 2008). 
 80. See, e.g., Hovsepian, 359 F.3d at 1164; Etape, 497 F.3d at 381. 
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USCIS’s determination and either remand the case back to USCIS with 
instructions on how to proceed with the application or decide whether the 
applicant should be awarded citizenship.81  However, other courts have held 
that § 1447(b) provides the courts and USCIS with concurrent jurisdiction over 
the matter.82  Therefore, under this scenario, if USCIS makes a determination 
on an application during a § 1447(b) action, the court will consider the case 
moot and dismiss the action.83  Thus, there is a lack of consistency among the 
courts in terms of what role they actually play in § 1447(b) actions. 
A. Exclusive Jurisdiction 
Only a few appellate courts have decided whether § 1447(b) vests the 
district courts with exclusive jurisdiction prior to 2009.84  The Ninth Circuit in 
U.S. v. Hovsepian determined in 2004 that § 1447(b) does in fact give the 
district courts exclusive jurisdiction over pending naturalization applications.85  
In 2007, the Fourth Circuit in Etape v. Chertoff, relying heavily on Hovsepian, 
came to the same conclusion.86 
1. U.S. v. Hovsepian 
Hovsepian was the first federal appellate court to determine whether § 
1447(b) vests the district courts with exclusive jurisdiction over pending 
naturalization applications.87  In determining that § 1447(b) grants the courts 
with exclusive jurisdiction, the Ninth Circuit looked at the law’s text, the 
statutory context, and congressional policy objectives.88 
In viewing the statutory text of § 1447(b), the Ninth Circuit noted several 
reasons why it grants the courts exclusive jurisdiction.89  First, the Ninth 
Circuit found that a concurrent jurisdiction interpretation of § 1447(b) would 
be inconsistent with the entire language of the statute.90  Because § 1447(b) 
states that the district courts “may either determine the matter or remand the 
matter, with appropriate instructions, to [USCIS] to determine the matter,”91 
and because the statute expressly gives the courts, and only the courts, the 
option to either remand the case to USCIS or determine the application for 
 
 81. See 8 U.S.C. § 1447(b). 
 82. See, e.g., Bustamante, 533 F. Supp. 2d at 381. 
 83. See id. 
 84. See Bustamante v. Napolitano, 582 F.3d 403, 410 (2d Cir. 2009); Etape, 497 F.3d at 
381–82, 388; Hovsepian, 359 F.2d at 1152, 1159, 1164. 
 85. Hovsepian, 359 F.2d at 1164. 
 86. Etape, 497 F.3d at 388. 
 87. See Hovsepian, 359 F.3d at 1159, 1164. 
 88. Id. at 1159–64. 
 89. Id. 1160–61. 
 90. Id. at 1160. 
 91. 8 U.S.C. § 1447(b) (2006). 
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itself,92 the Ninth Circuit determined that Congress intended for the courts to 
have exclusive jurisdiction.  Moreover the Ninth Circuit found that the courts 
could not necessarily determine the matter if USCIS could also determine the 
outcome of the application, which would be the case under a concurrent 
jurisdiction scheme.93 
Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit looked at the “remand” language in § 
1447(b).94  According to the Ninth Circuit, if in fact USCIS had concurrent 
jurisdiction during a § 1447(b) action, there would be no reason for Congress 
to place the word “remand” in the statute because USCIS would have the 
power to decide the application all along.95  Moreover, the Ninth Circuit noted 
that when a typical case is remanded to a district court, it is remanded because 
the district court lost jurisdiction over the matter.96  In essence, remand 
provides for a hierarchy, where a higher body of law can send a case back to a 
lower body of law.97  However, under a concurrent-jurisdiction interpretation, 
the court could not “remand the case,” in the typical sense, if in fact USCIS 
retained the same jurisdiction as the court throughout the § 1447(b) action.98  
Moreover, if USCIS had the power to make a determination on the application 
all along, then the word “remand” in the statute would be meaningless.99  The 
Ninth Circuit stated that it could not interpret the statute in such as manner that 
would render a portion of it meaningless.100 
The Ninth Circuit found further support for its statutory interpretation of § 
1447(b) in Brock v. Pierce County.101  In Brock, the Supreme Court “held that 
an agency does not lose jurisdiction unless the statute at issue requires that the 
agency act within a particular time period and the statute specifies a 
consequence for failure to comply with the time limit.”102  According to 
Hovsepian, § 1447(b) requires that USCIS act within a particular time frame of 
120 days from the applicant’s initial interview and specifies a consequence for 
USCIS’s failure to act within the 120 days by handing over jurisdiction to the 
courts.103  Hence, applying Brock, the Ninth Circuit concluded that USCIS 
loses jurisdiction after 120 days. 
 
 92. Hovsepian, 359 F.3d at 1160. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. 
 97. See id. 
 98. See Hovsepian, 359 F.3d at 1160. 
 99. See id. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. at 1161. 
 102. Id. See also Brock v. Pierce County, 476 U.S. 253, 259 (1986). 
 103. Hovsepian, 359 F.3d at 1161. 
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The Ninth Circuit also looked to the statutory context of § 1447(b) to 
determine that the district courts have exclusive jurisdiction over pending 
naturalization applications.104  When interpreting the meaning of the statute, 
the Ninth Circuit noted that it must “consider Congress’ words in the context 
of the overall statutory scheme.”105  Thus, the court looked to another statute in 
the same sub-chapter as § 1447(b).106  That statute, 8 U.S.C. § 1421(c), 
provides that a district court can review a naturalization application de novo if 
USCIS denied the application, and the applicant has exhausted all appeals at 
the agency level.107  Because district courts are allowed to determine 
naturalization applications in § 1447(b) actions just like courts in § 1421(c) 
hearings, the Ninth Circuit found, based on a consistent statutory-context 
interpretation, that the courts retain the final word in § 1447(b) suits just as the 
courts retain the final word in § 1421(c) hearings.108  Thus, by having the final 
word, the courts retain exclusive jurisdiction in § 1447(b) suits.109 
Hovsepian went on to explain congressional policy objectives when 
Congress enacted the Immigration Act of 1990.110  Congress’s four main 
objectives, according to the Ninth Circuit, were “to reduce the waiting time for 
naturalization applicants,” to “streamline the process of applying for 
naturalization and . . . to reduce the burdens on courts and [USCIS],” to 
maintain “consistency and fairness of naturalization decisions,” and “to give 
naturalization applicants the power to choose which forum [to] adjudicate their 
applications.”111 
If Congress’s purpose in enacting the Immigration Act of 1990 was to 
reduce the waiting time for applicants applying for naturalization, Congress’s 
purpose would be undermined if the courts maintained that the statute allowed 
for concurrent jurisdiction, according to Hovsepian.112  Congress’s purpose 
would be undermined because USCIS would have no incentive to make a 
determination on an application within the 120-day time frame if it could 
simply make a determination during a pending § 1447(b) action in the district 
court.113  Therefore, nothing would really change for USCIS once a § 1447(b) 
action started because the agency would have the same power that it had prior 
to the start of the § 1447(b) action.114  Thus, if the courts determined that 8 
 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. n.14 (citing A-Z Int’l v. Phillips, 323 F.3d 1141, 1147 (9th Cir. 2003)). 
 106. Id. at 1161–62. 
 107. 8 U.S.C. § 1421(c) (2006). 
 108. Hovsepian, 359 F.3d at 1162. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. at 1163. 
 111. Id. at 1163–64. 
 112. Id. at 1163. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Hovsepian, 359 F.3d at 1163. 
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U.S.C. § 1447(b) mandated concurrent jurisdiction, “Congress’ intent to 
require [USCIS] to make a determination within 120 days of an applicant’s 
examination” would be frustrated.115 
The Ninth Circuit also addressed Congress’s intention to streamline the 
naturalization process in enacting the Immigration Act of 1990.116  By 
allowing both USCIS and the courts to maintain concurrent jurisdiction, the 
end result would “lead to a waste of time and resources because district courts 
and [USCIS] would often engage in unnecessary duplication of factual 
investigations and legal analyses.”117  Furthermore, allowing USCIS to 
maintain jurisdiction would waste resources if USCIS made a determination on 
a naturalization application during a pending § 1447(b) action.118  According to 
the court, if USCIS denied the application during a pending action under a 
concurrent-jurisdiction scheme, the courts would have to dismiss the case, and 
the applicant would have to exhaust all administrative hearings before bringing 
his case back to the court.119  Unless the applicant moved to a different district, 
more than likely the same court would end up reviewing the same 
naturalization application that was brought during the § 1447(b) action.120  
Undoubtedly, this process would be duplicative and clog up the court system’s 
resources.121  Therefore, if courts were to hold that § 1447(b) allows for 
concurrent jurisdiction, the courts and USCIS would be overly burdened, 
which would frustrate Congress’s intention of streamlining the naturalization 
process.122 
The Ninth Circuit also concluded that if § 1447(b) vests both USCIS and 
the courts with jurisdiction, there would be a race to determine the result of a 
naturalization application, which would frustrate the drafters’ concerns of 
consistency and fairness in naturalization determinations.123  When there is a 
disagreement between USCIS and a district court as to whether a naturalization 
application should be granted, the first to decide on the application would 
ultimately prevail if both the courts and USCIS had jurisdiction.124  According 
to the Ninth Circuit, there would be a rush to the finish line to make a decision 
on the applications by both the courts and USCIS, which would lead to 
mistakes in reviewing the application.125  In the eyes of the applicant, when 
 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Hovsepian, 359 F.3d at 1163–64. 
 121. See id. 
 122. Id. at 1164. 
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there is a rush to determine the merits of a naturalization application, the 
legitimacy of the process is diminished.126  This would not stay true to the 
congressional objective of fairness in the process.127  Moreover, as noted by 
the Ninth Circuit, a finding that § 1447(b) gives courts exclusive jurisdiction 
advances the consistency of the process because courts would have the last 
word on both delayed applications in § 1447(b) actions, as well as on 
application denials per § 1421(c).128  Therefore, by concluding that § 1447(b) 
provides courts with exclusive jurisdiction over pending applications, the 
process of reviewing delayed applications would be consistent with the process 
of reviewing denied applications, which, according to the Ninth Circuit, would 
ultimately be fairer to the applicant.129 
In looking at the fourth and final congressional objective, that Congress 
intended for applicants to choose the forum to adjudicate their naturalization 
applications, the court found further support for its holding that § 1447(b) 
provides courts with exclusive jurisdiction over pending naturalization 
applications.130  In the words of Congressman Morrison, “it is the applicant, 
not the government, who decides the place and setting and the timeframe in 
which the application will be processed.”131  Thus, by finding that § 1447(b) 
provides for concurrent jurisdiction, the applicant would be stripped of a 
judicial determination if USCIS elected to make a decision on the 
naturalization application during the pending action.132  Therefore, the Ninth 
Circuit found further support for its finding that 8 U.S.C. § 1447(b) provides 
the courts with exclusive jurisdiction over pending naturalization applications. 
2. Etape v. Chertoff 
Three years after the Hovsepian decision, the Fourth Circuit, in Etape, 
determined whether or not 8 U.S.C. § 1447(b) vests the district courts with 
exclusive jurisdiction over pending naturalization applicants.133  The Fourth 
Circuit relied heavily upon the Ninth Circuit’s decision to determine that § 
1447(b) does in fact vest the district courts with exclusive jurisdiction.134  
However, the Fourth Circuit also came up with some further points to bolster 
the exclusive jurisdiction holding. 
 
 126. Hovsepian, 359 F.3d at 1164. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. 
 129. See id. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. (citing 135 CONG. REC. 16,995 (1989) (statement of Rep. Morrison) (emphasis 
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 132. See Hovsepian, 359 F.3d at 1164. 
 133. Etape v. Chertoff, 497 F.3d 379, 381 (4th Cir. 2007). 
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The Fourth Circuit stated that by allowing USCIS to maintain concurrent 
jurisdiction under § 1447(b), the court would be stripped of its power to 
determine the matter or remand the issue back to USCIS if USCIS made a 
decision on a naturalization application during a pending § 1447(b) action.135  
Essentially, by allowing USCIS to make a determination on an application 
during a pending action, the courts would be divested of their jurisdictional 
power.136  According to the Fourth Circuit, Congress’s intent was not to divest 
the courts’ jurisdictional power by allowing USCIS to essentially take over a 
pending matter.137 
The Fourth Circuit also expanded upon some of the congressional policy 
conclusions made by the Ninth Circuit in Hovsepian.  The Fourth Circuit noted 
that most of USCIS’s investigatory functions take place before the applicant’s 
initial examination and that the 120-day clock does not start ticking until well 
after USCIS has already made some of its findings.138  For example, FBI 
fingerprint checks are generally completed in a few days and, in some cases, 
even minutes.139  Therefore, according to the Fourth Circuit, USCIS’s 
expertise, which Congress intended to employ in the statute, would not be 
undermined by giving the district courts exclusive jurisdiction, as a majority of 
USCIS’s investigations, including some background checks, take place well 
before a petitioner can even bring a § 1447(b) action.140  Putting worries to rest 
that courts do not have the resources to conduct investigations and that 
allowing courts to conduct investigations will “strain[] judicial resources,”141 
the court concluded that Congress had faith in allowing the courts to conduct 
de novo reviews of naturalization applications, and judicial resources would 
not be strained if the court chose the option of sending the case back to 
USCIS.142  Thus, the Fourth Circuit strengthened the conclusion that 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1447(b) provides courts with exclusive jurisdiction as opposed to jurisdiction 
shared by the courts and USCIS. 
B. Concurrent Jurisdiction 
Although many courts have held that 8 U.S.C. § 1447(b) provides courts 
with exclusive jurisdiction over pending applications,143 some courts have 
 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. at 383. 
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concluded otherwise.144  Although overruled in 2009,145 Bustamante v. 
Chertoff provides an example of the reasoning behind those courts in other 
circuits that find that § 1447(b) provides both the courts and USCIS with 
jurisdiction over applications.146  In Bustamante, the plaintiff filed a complaint 
pursuant to § 1447(b) after receiving no response from USCIS after 120 days 
from taking his naturalization examination.147  While the action was pending in 
the district court, USCIS denied the plaintiff’s application.148  Although the 
district court acknowledged that the majority of courts have found that § 
1447(b) vests the courts with exclusive jurisdiction over naturalization 
applications,149 the district court went against the grain and determined that § 
1447(b) does not divest USCIS of its jurisdiction over the matter.150 
In Bustamante, the court looked at the statute’s plain language151 and 
legislative history,152 and found that the Supreme Court also supported 
concurrent jurisdiction.153  The district court determined that the plain language 
of § 1447(b) does not divest the agency of jurisdiction in an action involving a 
pending naturalization application.154  By looking at other statutes passed by 
Congress,155 the district court inferred that the absence of the word “exclusive” 
in § 1447(b) allows the agency to retain jurisdiction over pending 
naturalization applications.156  The court was not persuaded by the plaintiff’s 
argument that the words “determine” and “remand” in the statute grant the 
courts exclusive jurisdiction over pending naturalization applications.157  As 
stated under § 1447(b), when a plaintiff brings an action in a district court for a 
delinquent decision on the part of USCIS, the court can determine whether to 
 
 144. See Bustamante v. Chertoff, 533 F.Supp.2d 373, 376 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (holding that 8 
U.S.C. § 1447(b) provides for concurrent jurisdiction among the courts and USCIS); Perry v. 
Gonzales, 472 F.Supp.2d 623, 630 (D.N.J. 2007); Al-Saleh v. Gonzales, No. 2:06-CV-00604 TC, 
2007 WL 990145, at *2 (D. Utah Mar. 29, 2007). 
 145. See Bustamante v. Napolitano, 582 F.3d 403, 410 (2d Cir. 2009). 
 146. Bustamante, 533 F.Supp.2d at 381. 
 147. Id. at 374. 
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 149. Id. at 376. 
 150. Id. 
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 152. Bustamante, 533 F. Supp. 2d at 378. 
 153. Id. at 380. 
 154. Id. at 376. 
 155. Id. (reviewing statutes, such as 5 U.S.C. § 8477 (2006), 6 U.S.C. § 442 (2006), 7 U.S.C. 
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remand the case to USCIS or it can adjudicate the application.158  However, 
according to the court, the word “remand” in the statute does not mean that the 
courts are given exclusive jurisdiction in a pending application proceeding.159  
Instead, the court determined that the word “remand” only gives a court the 
option to remand the application back to USCIS or to adjudicate the 
application if USCIS had not acted on a pending naturalization application 
during a § 1447(b) action.160 
The court in Bustamante refuted both the Ninth and Fourth Circuits’ 
conclusions that the courts would lose their power if § 1447(b) bestowed 
USCIS with jurisdiction.161  Bustamante came to the opposite conclusion, 
finding that it was not the courts but rather USCIS that would lose its power 
under a concurrent-jurisdiction scheme.162  According to Bustamante, if both 
USCIS and the courts had jurisdiction over pending naturalization applications, 
obviously either the court or USCIS would come to a determination on the 
application first.163  If a court made a decision to grant or deny an application 
before USCIS, USCIS would have to take the court’s decision on the 
application without objection.164  However, if USCIS came to a determination 
first and denied a pending naturalization application, the courts would still be 
able to have a final say on appeal.165  In such a situation, the courts would still 
have jurisdiction over the matter to determine if the application was improperly 
denied and would have the power to reverse the findings of USCIS.166 
Furthermore, the court concluded that when an application is denied or 
granted by USCIS during a § 1447(b) action, USCIS itself does not divest the 
court of its jurisdictional power under a concurrent jurisdiction 
interpretation.167  Rather, the court stated that the Constitution divests the court 
of its power.168  When USCIS grants or denies an application during a pending 
action, the controversy becomes moot, according to the court.169  In such a 
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situation, the court stated that the Constitution would forbid the action from 
going any further—not USCIS.170 
The court in Bustamante also considered Congress’s intent and found 
further support that § 1447(b) does not vest the courts with exclusive 
jurisdiction.171  The court believed that the Ninth and Fourth Circuits were 
wrong in deciding that exclusive jurisdiction best served Congress’s intent of 
speeding up the naturalization process, concluding that, instead, the Ninth and 
Fourth Circuits’ interpretation would actually slow down the naturalization 
process.172  According to the court, “the filing of a § 1447(b) action prods 
[US]CIS into making a decision.”173  When an applicant is either granted or 
denied his citizenship during a pending action, the court noted that USCIS 
usually acts within 60 days of the action being filed, before a Rule 16 
conference can be held.174  If concurrent jurisdiction was not the intent of 
Congress in enacting § 1447(b), speedy resolutions would be hard to come by 
because in many instances, district courts remand the case back to the agency 
instead of determining the application on the merits.175  In such a situation, if 
the applicant is denied citizenship, the applicant must exhaust administrative 
appeals before bringing his action back into the court for further review.176 
The court again looked to Hovsepian and refuted some of the conclusions 
made by the Ninth Circuit.177  First, the court did not find that applicants would 
have to wait longer if USCIS had jurisdiction over the application.178  Under a 
concurrent-jurisdiction interpretation, according to Hovsepian, the applicant 
would have to exhaust all administrative appeals before bringing his or her 
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case back into the district court if USCIS denied the application during the 
§ 1447(b) action.179  The court found two problems with Hovsepian’s 
conclusion: the Ninth Circuit assumed that USCIS denies most applications in 
pending lawsuits and that district courts actually decide the applications on the 
merits.180  The court stated that it had never been proven that USCIS primarily 
denies applications.181  Therefore, if the courts had concurrent jurisdiction and 
USCIS grants an application during a pending action, the naturalization 
process would actually be sped up.182  Furthermore, the court stated that since a 
district court cannot be forced to make a decision on the merits of a pending 
naturalization application, it is unlikely that the courts will actually determine 
the merits of the application due to busy dockets.183  Thus, with the high 
probability that courts will remand the application back to USCIS, an incentive 
is given to USCIS to quickly determine the naturalization application in the 
pending transaction.184  Therefore, the court in Bustamante determined that § 
1447(b) did not divest USCIS of its jurisdiction because it would undermine 
the legislative intent in enacting the statute.185 
Finally, Bustamante relied heavily on the Supreme Court decision in 
Brock,186 just as the court in Hovsepian relied on Brock to support its 
conclusion that § 1447(b) provides exclusive jurisdiction over pending 
applications.187  The court in Bustamante concluded that nothing in § 1447(b)’s 
statutory text requires USCIS to make a determination within 120 days on a 
naturalization application, unlike the case in Brock where the statutory 
language required the agency to make a determination within 120 days.188  
Furthermore, looking at the Court’s ruling in Brock, the court drew the 
conclusion that § 1447(b) does not “specify a consequence” requiring a 
divestment of USCIS’s jurisdiction.189  According to the court, all § 1447(b) 
does is give the applicant an option to bring an action to court in the event that 
the applicant has not received a timely decision on his or her naturalization 
application, which does not mean that USCIS is automatically divested of its 
jurisdictional power.190  Thus, the court found that its reasoning fell inline with 
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the decision in Brock because there was no clear, unequivocal language in § 
1447(b) showing Congress’s intent to strip USCIS of its jurisdictional 
power.191  Therefore, the court in Bustamante concluded that 8 U.S.C. § 
1447(b) provides for concurrent jurisdiction between USCIS and the courts.192 
IV.  REMAND OR DECIDE? 
In the event that a court retains jurisdiction over a § 1447(b) action, it must 
decide whether to remand the case to USCIS or to grant or deny the applicant 
citizenship itself.193  However, just like the courts conflict on whether § 
1447(b) provides the courts with exclusive or concurrent jurisdiction, the 
courts have come to different conclusions on whether to remand the case to 
USCIS or to grant or deny the naturalization application.194 
A. Remand 
A majority of courts have decided to remand the application to USCIS 
with instructions rather than adjudicate the matter.195  Primarily, courts have 
come to this conclusion when dealing with situations where the FBI 
background checks have not been fully completed.196  In such situations, 
USCIS has no authority to determine an application until the FBI has 
completed the background check.197 
In Manzoor v. Chertoff, the court remanded the case with instructions to 
USCIS rather than determine the petitioner’s qualifications for 
naturalization.198  In that case, not all of the plaintiff’s background checks had 
been completed at the time the plaintiff initiated the action.199  The court 
decided to remand the case after looking at a number of factors.200  Looking 
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first to background checks, the court in Manzoor came to the conclusion that 
the courts could not analyze background checks on applicants in the same 
manner as USCIS, and furthermore, in many cases, USCIS must ask follow-up 
questions to determine the applicant’s qualifications for naturalization.201  
Since the FBI conducts the background checks, and USCIS analyzes the results 
of the background checks, the court found USCIS was in the better position to 
interpret and follow up on background checks than the courts.202 
The court also decided to remand the case to USCIS due to its finding that 
the 120-day time frame in § 1447(b) was to accelerate the naturalization 
process rather to impede it.203  At the time the case was decided, it was 
USCIS’s policy to complete the initial examination before completing name 
checks.204  The court concluded that if it were to decide the case for itself, the 
courts would “discourage [US]CIS from continuing its practice of scheduling 
interviews prior to the completion of the FBI background checks.”205  The 
court hinted that if it were to grant or deny the petitioner citizenship, it would 
encourage USCIS to complete all background checks, including the name 
check, before the initial interview.206  Thus, the 120-day time frame would not 
kick in until after USCIS had completed the initial interview – which would 
occur after the name check – and impede the acceleration process.207  
Additionally, because USCIS was simply waiting for a response from the FBI 
(which it needed in order to adjudicate the naturalization application), the court 
thought it only fair to hand the case back over to USCIS, since the agency had 
no authority in the first place to adjudicate the application.208 
Manzoor also noted that “nothing in § 1447(b) mandates that USCIS make 
a decision within 120 days of the initial interview” because all the statute says 
is that an applicant has the option to go to court to compel action on the 
application.209  Also, the court found that USCIS does not necessarily even 
have authority to grant or deny a naturalization application before or after 120 
days of the initial interview due to the fact that USCIS cannot make a 
determination on a naturalization application until after all background checks 
are complete.210  Therefore, the court determined that if USCIS’s delay is due 
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 205. Manzoor, 472 F. Supp. 2d at 808. 
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to the FBI’s failure to complete a background check, the court should remand 
the case back to USCIS.211 
Finally, in coming to its conclusion to remand the case to USCIS, the court 
in Manzoor stated that it did not want applicants to use the court system as a 
way of expediting their naturalization applications by filing lawsuits with the 
district courts, as it was not Congress’s intent in enacting § 1447(b) to provide 
individuals with a way to expedite the naturalization process.212  According to 
the district court, when applicants file such lawsuits, the lawsuit distracts 
USCIS and eats away at the agency’s resources.213  By remanding the case to 
USCIS with instructions to make a decision, the court stated that this would 
prevent applicants from “jump[ing] to the front of the line” to get 
determinations on their naturalization applications.214  Rather, courts should 
determine the case for themselves only in rare instances where both the 
background checks and initial interview have already been completed, which 
shows an unnecessary delay on the part of USCIS.215 
B. Adjudicating the Application 
Only a handful of courts have decided to adjudicate a naturalization 
application rather than to remand the application to USCIS.216 In 
Taalebinezhaad v. Chertoff, the court denied USCIS’s motion to remand the 
application to USCIS and, instead, opted to hold a hearing on the merits.217  
While the court noted that a majority of courts dealing with § 1447(b) hearings 
generally remand, the court also noted that such decisions to remand generally 
occur when the FBI had failed to complete an essential background check or 
there were other security concerns at hand.218  Because the government had not 
established that any background checks on the plaintiff were pending and the 
plaintiff had waited for over two years for a decision on the application, the 
court in Taalebinezhaad decided that it should not remand given the 
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circumstances of the case.219  The court decided it would take matters into its 
own hands due to USCIS’s failure to provide the plaintiff with a timely 
response when USCIS had all of the background check results.220  
Furthermore, the court stated that USCIS could present findings to the court to 
help the court come to a conclusion on the application, which countered the 
argument that USCIS is better equipped to make decisions on naturalization 
applications.221 
However, in Attisha v. Jenifer, the court refused to remand the case to 
USCIS despite the fact that the FBI name check had not yet been completed.222  
Due to the fact that almost two and a half years had passed since a request for a 
name check had been made, the court stated that the delay was 
inappropriate.223  While recognizing that completing mandatory background 
checks is an important function of USCIS, the court stated that remanding the 
case in no way would expedite the plaintiff’s background check, given the fact 
that USCIS could not guarantee that a decision on the application could be 
rendered by a specific time.224  By interpreting that § 1447(b) was enacted in 
part to ensure that USCIS does not unreasonably delay determinations on 
naturalization applications, the court found it proper to take over the action and 
to determine the merits of the application for itself.225 
V.  AUTHOR’S ANALYSIS: TAKING OVER THE ACTION AND DETERMINING THE 
APPLICATION ONCE AND FOR ALL 
A. Exclusive Jurisdiction 
For many reasons, courts should find that 8 U.S.C. § 1447(b) vests the 
court with exclusive jurisdiction.  From § 1447(b)’s statutory text to the 
congressional intent of enacting § 1447(b), concurrent jurisdiction with USCIS 
would frustrate the goals of Congress in implementing the statute. 
By looking at the cases discussed, the Ninth and Fourth Circuits arguably 
make better points that the courts should retain exclusive jurisdiction over 
pending naturalization applications, as opposed to the court in Bustamante, 
which found that § 1447(b) grants both the courts and USCIS with jurisdiction.  
The Fourth and Ninth Circuits’ strongest points came from their statutory-text 
interpretations, as well as the fact that Congress intended to speed up the 
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naturalization process in enacting the Immigration Act of 1990.  Because the 
text of the statute expressly states that the courts have the power to either 
remand the application or make a determination on the matter,226 it makes 
sense that courts would retain exclusive jurisdiction over § 1447(b) matters 
unless the court decided to remand the matter to USCIS.227  Furthermore, the 
Ninth Circuit made a compelling point: Why would Congress even place the 
word “remand” in the statutory text if in fact USCIS were to have concurrent 
jurisdiction with the courts throughout § 1447(b) actions?228  In essence, under 
a concurrent-jurisdiction interpretation, the courts would have nothing to 
remand to USCIS because USCIS would have the power to “remand” the case 
to itself.229  As stated by the Ninth Circuit, “When we ‘remand’ a case to the 
district court . . . we do so because the district court has lost jurisdiction once 
we acquire it upon the filing of a proper notice of appeal . . . The most natural 
reading is that Congress used the term ‘remand’ in the same sense.”230  Thus, 
under this analysis, USCIS has no jurisdiction once a § 1447(b) action is 
filed.231  Moreover, by analyzing the definition of the word “remand” in such a 
context, courts have found that a portion of the statute would be rendered 
meaningless, which cannot be done, as every word in a statute must be given 
full effect.232 
In terms of statutory construction, the court in Bustamante concluded in 
part that § 1447(b) gives both the courts and USCIS jurisdiction over 
naturalization applications because the word “exclusive” was not mentioned in 
the statutory text.233  While the language of § 1447(b) does not include the 
words “exclusive jurisdiction” as do other statutes,234 the absence of such 
language should not have factored into the court’s analysis of whether § 
1447(b) actions vest courts with exclusive jurisdiction.235  Although such an 
analysis on its face may be compelling, the court in Bustamante failed to note 
that the words “concurrent jurisdiction” are nowhere found within the text of 
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the statute either.236  By determining that both the courts and USCIS have 
jurisdiction in § 1447(b) actions due to the fact that the words “exclusive 
jurisdiction” are not explicitly referenced to in the statute,237 the opposite 
interpretation – that the courts have exclusive jurisdiction over § 1447(b) 
actions – could be true as well, since the statute does not explicitly state the 
words “concurrent jurisdiction.”238  Congress has used the words “concurrent 
jurisdiction” in some statutes,239 just as it has used the words “exclusive 
jurisdiction” in others.240 Moreover, the text of the statute explicitly states 
“[s]uch court has jurisdiction over the matter.”241  Because USCIS is not a 
court, it can be inferred from the text that this phrase does in fact explicitly 
give the courts exclusive jurisdiction, since the statute does not say that USCIS 
has jurisdiction.242  Thus, Bustamante’s textual reading of § 1447(b) is less 
than compelling in terms of statutory construction. 
Also, as touched upon in Hovsepian, by finding that USCIS and the courts 
have concurrent jurisdiction, the delay could be even longer if USCIS denies a 
naturalization application in the course of a proceeding.243  Ultimately, if the 
petitioner wishes to appeal a denial on his or her naturalization application, the 
applicant must “request a hearing before an immigration officer.”244  If the 
petitioner’s application is once again denied, only then can the petitioner go 
before a district court for a review of USCIS’s decision.245  More than likely, 
by giving USCIS jurisdiction with the courts, in this scenario, the delay in 
adjudicating the naturalization process would be even longer, as the applicant 
would have to exhaust all administrative requirements before requesting a 
hearing by the court.  Although the court in Bustamante did not find this 
argument compelling, due to the fact that there was no evidence showing that 
most applications are denied and no evidence that most courts actually 
determine the matter for themselves, many applications will in fact be denied, 
which would inevitably cause the naturalization process to be dragged on even 
further.  And, even if the court does not decide the matter for itself and instead 
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decides to remand the case to USCIS, interpreting the statute to mean that the 
courts have exclusive jurisdiction still falls in line with Congress’s intent of 
giving applicants judicial recourse.246  Thus, once again, Congress’s overall 
intent of speeding up the naturalization process would be undermined by 
allowing USCIS to have concurrent jurisdiction. 
Furthermore, throughout the majority of the United States’ history, courts 
have played a role in the naturalization process. Prior to the Immigration Act 
of 1990, an individual could only gain citizenship by court approval.247  
Although Congress enacted an agency to aid the courts in naturalization 
procedures,248 from 1790249 until 1990250 courts had the final say on ultimately 
who could become a U.S. citizen.  However, by taking the courts out of 
making initial determinations on who could or could not become a citizen,251 
Congress recognized that removing the courts from naturalization matters was 
not an easy thing.252  As stated in a House Report that led to the elimination of 
“initial” court adjudications on naturalization applications, “[r]emoval of the 
200-year-old naturalization process from the Judiciary is not a step taken 
lightly by the Committee.  The Committee notes the important role the Courts 
have performed in the past of welcoming citizens to the U.S.”253  As the 
Committee noted, the backlog in the courts’ dockets, which caused delays in 
the naturalization process led to the demise of the court systems’ role in 
naturalization procedures.254  Congress, although granting USCIS the authority 
 
 246. H.R. REP. NO. 101-187, at 14 (1989). 
 247. See Act of Mar. 26, 1790, ch. 3, § 1, 1 Stat. 103 (repealed 1795); Naturalization Act of 
June 29, 1906, ch. 3592, § 3, 34 Stat. 596. 
 248. See § 1, 34 Stat. 596 (“That the designation of the Bureau of Immigration in the 
Department of Commerce and Labor is hereby changed to the ‘Bureau of Immigration and 
Naturalization,’ . . . [and it] shall have charge of all matters concerning the naturalization of 
aliens.”). 
 249. See 1 Stat. 103 (“That any alien being a free white person . . . for the term of two years, 
may be admitted to become a citizen thereof, on application to any common law court of 
record”); LEGISLATION FROM 1790–1900, supra note 18, at 1 (stating that the Act of March 26, 
1790 was “the first federal activity in an area previously under the control of the individual 
states”). 
 250. Morawetz, supra note 22, at 454. See also 8 U.S.C. § 1446(d) (2006) (“The employee [of 
USCIS] designated to conduct any such examination shall make a determination as to whether the 
application should be granted or denied, with reasons therefor.”). 
 251. See id. See also 8 U.S.C. § 1421(c) (2006) (giving courts the power to review denials of 
naturalization applications, as opposed to giving the courts the power to make an initial 
determination on naturalization applications); 8 U.S.C. § 1447(b) (2006) (giving courts the power 
to review naturalization applications after USCIS fails to make a decision on a naturalization 
application, as opposed to giving the courts the power to make an initial determination on 
naturalization applications). 
 252. See H.R. REP. NO. 101-187, at 8 (1989). 
 253. Id. 
 254. Id. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
606 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY PUBLIC LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXIX:581 
to grant citizenship, “recognized the longstanding power the district courts had 
possessed over naturalization applications and so provided . . . that district 
courts retained their power to review an application if an applicant so 
chose.”255 
If in fact naturalization adjudications were stripped away from the courts 
due to delays in determinations on applications, Congress’s plan of speeding 
up the naturalization process has ultimately fallen flat on its face.  In 1989, a 
House Report stated, “[f]ully qualified applicants must wait two years in some 
places to be sworn in as a U.S. citizen,”256 and it is clear that delays are equally 
as bad, if not worse, now than they were in 1989.  This can be seen from 
individuals like Zuhair Mah’d, who waited over two years to obtain his 
citizenship.257  Thus, if congressional members stripped the courts’ power to 
adjudicate naturalization applications with a heavy heart in order to speed up 
the naturalization process,258 it makes sense that the courts should retain 
exclusive jurisdiction over § 1447(b) matters.  Congress stripped the courts’ 
power to adjudicate naturalization applications when Congress decided to give 
USCIS the power to adjudicate naturalization applications due to adjudication 
delays in the courts.259  Thus, if there is a delay at the agency level in the 
adjudication of naturalization applications, it can be viewed that § 1447(b) is 
meant to strip USCIS of its jurisdictional power.  Since the courts were 
stripped of their power to adjudicate naturalization applications due to delays, 
USCIS should also be stripped of its jurisdictional power over the application 
due to its delay.  This can only be done if the courts find that § 1447(b) vests 
the courts with exclusive jurisdiction.  By giving USCIS concurrent 
jurisdiction with the courts on delayed naturalization determinations, the courts 
in essence are diverging from what Congress did to the courts in 1990 by 
taking away the courts’ power to decide applications. 
Furthermore, USCIS now conducts interviews after it obtains the results of 
applicants’ name checks, due to the number of lawsuits brought under § 
1447(b).260  As stated earlier, FBI name checks, which are only a portion of the 
background check, usually account for the delay.261  Since USCIS is only 
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responsible for delays that occur after the initial examination,262 the 
naturalization process will be further delayed by USCIS’s new policy.  This 
manipulation of the system by USCIS frustrates Congress’s intent of speeding 
up the naturalization process.263  Thus, due to USCIS’s attempt to thwart § 
1447(b) actions by conducting name checks before the initial interview, delays 
in the naturalization process can be even longer, and the courts should take 
over the matter exclusively to combat USCIS’s new policy. 
B. Adjudicating the Application 
Understandably, national security is a great concern in deciding whether or 
not to grant an individual citizenship, especially in a post-9/11 world.  This is 
why many courts, such as Manzoor,264 have chosen to remand applications to 
USCIS as opposed to adjudicating the applications.  Many courts believe 
USCIS is in a better position than the courts to analyze the background-check 
results from the FBI.265  For example, in Manzoor, the court stated that it was 
“not equipped to conduct background checks of naturalization applicants.”266  
However, as stated by the Fourth Circuit, USCIS “can utilize its expertise by 
presenting its findings to the court” in § 1447(b) proceedings.267  Moreover, for 
the courts that are unwilling to accept this argument, those courts should 
recognize that when the courts had the sole power to adjudicate naturalization 
applications, the courts utilized the agency’s recommendations and 
determinations in deciding whether to grant a naturalization application.268 
Furthermore, in those cases where a name check or any other background 
check has not yet been completed, USCIS can order the FBI to expedite the 
name check.269  Therefore, if USCIS orders the FBI to expedite a name check, 
presumably the courts can use the results of the name check to make a 
determination on the application.  And, because USCIS does in fact have the 
ability to request that the FBI expedite a name check, the courts should 
definitely take over the matter, because it is unreasonable for USCIS to not 
have requested such an expedition when applicants have waited long periods of 
time to receive a determination on their application.270  Once the courts receive 
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the results from the FBI check, they can utilize USCIS’s expertise to determine 
whether or not the application should be granted.271 
However, exactly how great a threat are these naturalization applicants to 
our nation’s security?  Before an individual can even become a naturalized 
U.S. citizen, the individual must have lived in the U.S. as a permanent resident 
for at least five years.272  Individuals applying for permanent-resident status 
must undergo FBI background checks, which includes name and fingerprint 
checks.273  As is the case for naturalization applications, the FBI hands the 
results of the background checks over to USCIS to rule on permanent-resident 
status adjustments.274  Although these checks are valid for only 15 months,275 it 
is clear that individuals applying for citizenship have already gone through 
security checks in order to be permitted to stay in the United States as 
permanent residents.  Concerning FBI background-check delays for 
naturalization applications, an attorney for the ACLU stated, “We should 
remember, these are people who’ve been living here in the U.S. with green 
cards for at least five years.  And so it doesn’t make sense that a delay is going 
to protect us from national security threats.”276  Thus, while national security is 
not a matter to be taken lightly, courts should make a note that naturalization 
applicants (if in fact legal permanent residents) have already undergone 
security checks in the past; if such individuals were such a huge threat to the 
nation’s security, more than likely they would not be in the U.S. 
Also, as is the case with concurrent jurisdiction, remanding the case to 
USCIS has the potential to frustrate Congress’s intent of speeding up the 
naturalization process.  When in fact USCIS is waiting for background-check 
conclusions, many courts will remand the case to USCIS and give USCIS 
vague instructions.  For example, in some cases, the courts have ordered 
USCIS to promptly make a decision on the application once the FBI 
background checks are complete.277  Thus, in all actuality, the petitioner could 
have to wait longer to receive a decision from USCIS, as “promptly” is not 
always defined in terms of a time limit.  Furthermore, when courts remand the 
case to USCIS, the applicant must then wait for USCIS to make a decision, 
which further delays the process; there would be no more delays if the court 
simply decided the issue of citizenship.  Even more troubling than this is if 
after the remand, USCIS decides to deny the applicant citizenship, then the 
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applicant would have to exhaust all appeals at the agency level before bringing 
an appeal in a district court.  In essence, this long struggle could be “nipped in 
the bud” if the court decided to determine the application for itself.  Thus, once 
again, we see that Congress’s intent of streamlining the process and curbing 
delays would be frustrated. 
By handing the case over to USCIS, the courts are giving USCIS more 
time to adjudicate naturalization applications and, at the same time, could give 
USCIS less incentive to make a decision on an application.  In essence, if the 
majority of courts remand naturalization applications in § 1447(b) cases, 
USCIS will still be able to make a decision on the application as opposed to the 
courts.278  Furthermore, by remanding the case to USCIS, the only thing that 
really changes is that the court may give USCIS a timetable to make a 
determination on the application.  However, while this decision may seem 
satisfactory to some, many applicants may not be so understanding because 
giving USCIS more time seems to undermine the whole point of the § 1447(b) 
action–to receive a determination on their application due to the failure of 
USCIS to make a determination on the application.  The courts should 
recognize that “a presumption of remand in delay cases undermines the 
statutory scheme of ready access to the courts in those cases.”279  In a way, it is 
almost disturbing that the courts would remand the case back to USCIS, 
because didn’t USCIS have its chance to make a decision on the application 
and fail to do so? Shouldn’t the courts adjudicate the application as a lesson to 
the agency to adjudicate the applications in a timelier manner? 
Even though USCIS does not have the authority to adjudicate a 
naturalization application until all background checks are complete, as 
addressed by Manzoor,280 § 1447(b) does not require that a background be 
complete in order for a court to adjudicate the application.  As stated earlier, 
while many courts refrain from adjudicating the application due to incomplete 
background checks, this should not stop the courts from adjudicating the 
application since USCIS has authority to expedite the name-check process.281  
Furthermore, USCIS’s own regulation states that a “decision to grant or deny 
the application shall be made at the time of the initial examination or within 
120-days after the date of the initial examination.”282  Moreover, 8 U.S.C. § 
1571(b) states that it “is the sense of Congress that the processing of an 
immigration benefit application should be completed not later than 180 days 
after the initial filing of the application.”283  Therefore, regarding delayed name 
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checks, USCIS should follow its own policy, as well as Congress’s intentions, 
and expedite the name check to ensure that individuals receive a timely 
response on their naturalization application. 
In-line with Manzoor’s worries that USCIS would change its policy of 
interviewing applicants before the completion of name-check results if the 
court decided to adjudicate the application,284 USCIS has since changed its 
policy and now conducts name checks before the initial interview.285  This is 
an attempt on the part of USCIS to evade § 1447(b) actions.286  Despite the fact 
that the majority of courts have remanded applications to USCIS, USCIS 
nonetheless decided to change its policy of interviewing applicants prior to the 
FBI’s name checks.  Courts should recognize that USCIS is taking advantage 
of the system and frustrating Congress’s intent of speeding up the 
naturalization process.  The new policy frustrates Congress’s intent because for 
§ 1447(b) actions, the 120-day clock will not start running until after both the 
name check and initial interview are complete.  Thus, now, applicants will 
more than likely have to wait even longer to receive a determination on their 
application and must wait longer before they can bring a § 1447(b) action in a 
district court.  Since the name check will be completed by the time the § 
1447(b) action has been initiated, the courts should take over the application 
and determine whether to grant or deny the application. 
Finally, if a court awards a petitioner citizenship instead of remanding the 
application to USCIS, the applicant may be able to recover attorney’s fees 
under the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA).287  The EAJA was enacted to 
encourage individuals to utilize the court system when their constitutional or 
statutory rights are violated.288  Because the EAJA provides that a prevailing 
party against an agency may recover attorney’s fees,289 this statute obviously 
can benefit prevailing applicants in § 1447(b) actions.  However, in some 
cases, if an application has been remanded to USCIS with no instructions from 
the court to grant or deny the application, a court might not consider the 
applicant to be a prevailing party, even if the applicant is awarded 
citizenship.290  Without § 1447(b) actions, virtually nothing would be in 
 
 284. In part of the court’s decision to remand the case to USCIS, the court believed that if it 
did not remand the case to USCIS, it would prompt USCIS to change its policy of interviewing 
applicants before the background checks to interviewing the applicants after the background 
checks were complete. See Manzoor, 472 F. Supp. 2d at 808–09. 
 285. Morawetz, supra note 22, at 457 n.54; Memo on Background Checks, supra note 74. 
 286. See Morawetz, supra note 22, at 457; Memo on Background Checks, supra note 74. 
 287. See Othman v. Chertoff, 309 F. App’x 792, 794 (5th Cir. 2008). 
 288. Letter from Walter H. Eason, Jr., President/CEO of EAJA, Limitations of the Equal 
Access to Justice Act Are So Great as to Deny Equal Access to Justice, Inc., to U.S. Citizen (Mar. 
15, 2005), http://www.equalaccess2justice.us/cgi-bin/index.cgi?page=EAJA+Information. 
 289. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A) (2000). 
 290. See Othman, 309 F. App’x at 794. 
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USCIS’s way to further delay naturalization adjudications, and since the EAJA 
encourages individuals to bring actions against agencies when individuals’ 
rights are violated, the court could potentially deter § 1447(b) actions.  This is 
so because individuals with low incomes may not bring § 1447(b) actions in 
fear that they will not receive compensation for attorney’s fees if the court 
remands the case to USCIS.  Thus, courts should take this into account when 
deciding whether to remand the case to USCIS or to adjudicate the application. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
Throughout the course of the United States’ history, courts have played at 
least some role in the naturalization process.  Once, that role was big, but 
slowly over time, that role has dwindled.  Recognizing the important role that 
courts have played in the naturalization process, courts should keep in mind 
that their role as primary adjudicators in determining naturalization 
applications only ended when the courts became backlogged and were unable 
to adjudicate naturalization petitions in a timely manner.  Thus, by finding that 
the courts and USCIS have concurrent jurisdiction in § 1447(b) actions, a great 
irony and tragedy would be present, for the exact reason an applicant brings a § 
1447(b) suit is because USCIS did not adjudicate the naturalization application 
in a timely manner.  Essentially, such a delay in the adjudication of 
naturalization applications is precisely why the courts were stripped of their 
power to determine naturalization applications almost twenty years ago.  
Furthermore, by looking at the statutory language, statutory context, and 
legislative intent of § 1447(b), it only makes sense that courts retain exclusive 
jurisdiction over such matters. 
Additionally, in deciding to remand applications to USCIS, in many ways 
the courts could drag out the naturalization process even further by requiring 
exhaustion of administrative remedies before making an appeal before a 
district court.  Ultimately, such a determination on the denied application could 
have been made if the court had simply determined the matter for itself initially 
in the § 1447(b) action.  While security seems to be the major reason why 
courts have decided to remand applications to USCIS, courts still have the 
ability to determine applications while still protecting the nation’s security by 
utilizing USCIS’s expertise.  Moreover, in situations where the background 
results have not been completed, the courts can have USCIS request that the 
name checks be expedited. 
The courts should thus take back the power they once had to adjudicate 
naturalization applications to send a message to USCIS that delays in 
naturalization adjudications will not be tolerated–just as Congress did to the 
courts almost twenty years ago.  However, not only should courts take over § 
1447(b) matters to prove a point to USCIS, but the courts should adjudicate the 
applications for the countless number of individuals who have been waiting for 
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years to become U.S. citizens.  Although Zuhair Mah’d’s story ended happily 
ever after, there are still others out there who are waiting. 
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